Researching our way to a brighter Arab future

According to Libya expert Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, ‘[t]he designation “Libya” was used during Greek and Roman times and was revived by the Italian colonialists in 1911’. We also believe that Libya’s pluralistic society and historical processes can be characterised by three major developments: Ottoman state formation, European commercial penetration and ongoing Saharan trade.

Situated at the centre of northern Africa, Libya’s landmass is equivalent to that of the UK, France and Germany combined, but with only three percent of those countries’ aggregate population. Libya is therefore mainly arid desert without major rivers, except in part of the north which benefits from Mediterranean Sea water. Thus, only about one percent of the country is arable; the remainder constituting part of the Sahara.

Rainfall is also scant and inconsistent, limiting Libya’s potential for agricultural trade and development which, ultimately, impacts the country’s unemployed youth population.

It was not until Italy’s colonial enterprise between 1911 and 1947 (inclusive) that a single political entity attempted to control more than one of Libya’s several historic regions in a centralised manner. This was achieved through the emergence of what would now be characterised as an administrative body, constituting the state, its regions and their several institutions. In our opinion, Italy’s reification of Libya into “administrative regions” did not only objectify and dehumanise local Libyan communities, but was equally designed to advance Italian colonial efforts irrespective of Libya’s nuanced demographic needs.

The protracted, psychological effects of colonialism on Libyan identity can thus be observed to this day, and we elaborate on this to a greater extent in the participant feedback subsection further below.

Cyrenaica-based Omar al-Mukhtar, who led Libya’s native guerrilla resistance against Italian colonialists, is championed until this day as a symbol of grassroots, working-class resistance to foreign-led occupation. He is an “underdog” figure like Morocco’s Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi. There have been numerous films and books produced about Omar al-Mukhtar’s life, including the 1981 film Lion of the Desert which starred Hollywood actor Anthony Quinn. The film, funded by Gaddafi, was censored in Italy by former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti as he believed that Lion of the Desert brought disrepute to the Italian army.

Omar al-Mukhtar’s identity as a working-class revolutionary, followed by Gaddafi’s reign as a self-proclaimed socialist leader, resonated with the Soviet Union, cultivating an ongoing alliance between Libya and Russia. In fact, many of the arms and armoured vehicles used by Libyan youths in the First Civil War of 2011 were sourced and purchased from post-Soviet Russia.

Following World War II (WWII), Italy renounced all claims to Libya, thus marking the end of 36 years of colonialism in the country according to the Paris Peace Treaties. In 1951, Idris I was anointed King of a newly and superficially “unified” Libya through appointment by the UK and the US; these nations evidently feared that Libya would continue to identify as a Soviet satellite-state during the Cold War and hence attempted (but later failed) to deploy an ally in the country.

The modern Libyan nation-state subsequently emerged in 1951 following the unification of Fezzan in the south-western quadrant, Tripolitania stretching from the west to Sidra on the coast and Cyrenaica covering the north-eastern and south-eastern quadrants. Over time, the various Arab, Ottoman and European encroachments bound for these territories aimed to establish trading posts whilst also aiming to tax local citizens and to extract natural resources.

Idris I was the grandson of Muhammad ibn Ali al-Senussi, the founder of the Senusiyya Sufi order, which spread in Libya in the 19^th century and influenced the tribal, social fabric of the country. The Senusiyya order served as one of the main sources of opposition against Italian colonialism, particularly in Cyrenaica, hence why Omar al-Mukhtar’s resistance is also referred to as a “Senussi” resistance. This resistance is an early example of the merging of religious and political mechanisms in the country.

King Idris I ruled the tribal system for 19 years before Muammar Gaddafi instigated a coup and seized the helm in 1969. Oil was first discovered in Libya in 1959, and after Gaddafi’s successful coup, oil rents allowed him to administer his authority without involving the majority of citizens in political processes. Libya became increasingly isolationist and aimed to implement a unified secular-socialist identity by focusing on thwarting opposition through economic development and a growing middle-class, as well as through reported acts of internalised detention and torture.

As with most rentier states, Gaddafi’s regime avoided diversifying Libya’s economy from its dependency on oil whilst also failing to create the impartial and inclusive economic and political institutions that are necessary for sustainable growth and conflict prevention. Namely, a slow and considered approach to establishing the institution of free and fair presidential elections did not arrive soon enough to render Libya immune to the Arab Spring uprisings.

Gaddafi’s centralised economy focused on oil extraction, swiftly making Libya a target of foreign intervention. This in turn facilitated Gaddafi’s role as a MENA strongman opposing Western imperialism. Thus, by seeking to distance himself from Western influences, Gaddafi paradoxically attracted the attention and interference of Western nations.

Indeed, many tense situations between Gaddafi and Western nations escalated out of control, such as the unresolved 1984 murder of British police officer PC Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan Embassy in London as well as the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist attack over Scottish territory (also dubbed the “Lockerbie bombing”).

Gaddafi also notably aligned himself with the Palestinian cause in opposition to Israeli occupation. The Cold War between Libya and the West brought the country under subsequent scrutiny from foreign agencies. In spite of a growing middle-class in the country, a small inner-circle monopolising power and wealth imposed a life of poverty for significant swathes of Libya’s alienated and disenfranchised population. Therefore, we believe that Libya had been a socialist republic in name but not entirely in practice.

We recognise that Gaddafi lived through various identity roles as a leader, first as a secular republican, then as a Muslim advocate of Sharia-inspired rule, then as an African ambassador promoting unification for African countries. Underpinning these different leadership roles was Gaddafi’s manifesto – also known as The Green Book – which advocated (at least in writing) for his socialist ideals. These diverse identity markers are further reflected in the various attitudes expressed by Libya’s youth across the ages.

A spectrum of Libyans cutting across socioeconomic classes rose in opposition to Gaddafi during the 2011 Arab uprisings. The NATO military campaign provided the decisive help needed to topple the regime. With Gaddafi’s defeat, a power vacuum was created for Western institutions seeking to define the future of Libya in an increasingly US-centric international system.

Critics of Libya’s “democratisation” highlight that NATO’s intervention posed its own ethical dilemmas and resulted in indiscriminate fire and human rights abuses by NATO-backed mercenaries.

Since the Arab Spring, two contending political entities hoping to govern have emerged: the Government of National Accords currently led by Mohamed al-Menfi in Tripoli, and the House of Representatives led by Aguila Saleh Issa in Tobruk. The outcome of the Arab Spring has consequently been met with mixed emotions throughout Libya. Younger respondents of our Arab Youth Survey from Libya expressed less satisfaction with current political representation in their country compared with their older counterparts. Libyans of 35 years of age and under, who are also based in Libya, therefore express a reasonably strong desire to migrate from their country.

The cumulative decisions and experiences of the past therefore shape Libya’s future. Present-day Libya remains dependent on natural resources, with oil constituting 60% of its GDP and national infrastructure being concentrated on the cultivation of Libya’s “rentier state” economy. Despite this, Libya’s GDP per capita is about 7,686 USD (as of 2019), which we recognise as relatively low compared with other MENA nations.

Furthermore, income inequality plagues present-day Libya, where health infrastructure is also inadequate. Contrastingly, literacy rates among Libya’s younger segments of society are notably high, with a literacy rate of over 99% for both males and females between and including the ages of 15 and 24 years old (according to 2004 data).

A high literacy rate among Libyan youths becomes even more impressive when understanding Libya’s demographic breakdown, which favours a high youth population almost equally split in numbers among the country’s two recognised genders.

Libya’s total population tallies to around seven million people, with most of the population living in the coastal cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. The vast majority also identifies as Arab or Arab-Amazigh and follows Sunni Islam, although there are between 300,000 and 400,000 Ibadi Libyans in the country (primarily concentrated in the Nafusa Mountains, in Tripoli and in Zuwara).

About half of Libyans are females, and stratifying Libya’s demography by age groups reveals how youthful Libyan society is: according to UNICEF’s statistics for 2012, 17.8% of Libya’s population is between 10 and 19 years of age (inclusive).

Our Arab Youth Survey focus group participants from Libya report that many Libyans continue to battle with the aftermath of conflict, which includes disruption to public facilities such as electricity, water and impaired public health infrastructure, as well as wide-spread government corruption.

Thus, a decade on, Libya faces a series of obstacles that affect the country’s entire population: young and old. First is regional security, prompted by militant Islamist organisations situated in the southern frontiers who have sought to take advantage of the Arab Spring. Next is the challenge of diversifying the economy away from oil, especially considering the accelerating global trend orientating away from fossil fuels and towards renewables; interestingly, survey respondents of our Arab Youth Survey from Libya scored environmental culture “very unfavourably” overall.

The most immediate concern for the future for many Libyans, however, is reaching a stable resolution to the ongoing conflict between the various factions and governments that have succeeded Gaddafi. During the recent “second wave” of violence in Libya, conflict escalated between the UN-backed Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in the pro-revolution west and the head of the Libyan National Army, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, in the pro-Gaddafi east.

It should be noted that Haftar also played a role in assisting Gaddafi’s 1969 coup against King Idris I, as well as commanding a Libyan army to support Egypt during the Yom Kippur War against Israel in 1973.

Foreign patrons such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have naturally sought to capitalise on the recent power contest in Libya, further complicating and undermining any potential for pan-Arab, sustainable development that ARAB would like to see in the MENA region. Therefore, Moroccan-brokered negotiations between Libya’s factions have failed to fully mitigate against the conflict.

One potential yet controversial solution to prevent further conflict from emerging in Libya would be to increase federalisation across the country, but the secession of eastern Libya from the rest of the country could conversely result in protracted violence and the division of Libyan families across the northern coast.